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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
COMBINED METALS REDUCTION COMPANY, a corporation,
and
BUD T. STEVENSON AND JOHN
E. ALVERSON, co-partners doing business under the firm name
and style of Stevenson & Alverson,
Plaintiffs,

CASE
NO. 6315

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Combined Metals
Reduction Company, a corporation, and Bud T. Stevenson and John E. Alverson, co-partners doing business
under the firm name and style of Stevenson & Alverson,
to review a decision of the Industrial Commission hold-
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ing services performed by Stevenson and Alverson, lessee
miners of the company, to be services performed "in
employment" with the meaning of Section 19(j), Chapter
43, Laws of Utah, 1937, and Chapter 52, Laws of Utah,
1939. The Combined Metals Reduction Company, is a
corporation, (an "employer" under the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law (Tr. 3)), engaged in mining
operations in certain mining properties, including those
known as the Queen Tunnel and the Butterfield Tunnel.
On June 9, 1938, Bud T. Stevenson and John E. Alverson, hereinafter designated as "lessees" entered into
a lease agreement with the Combined Metals Reduction
Company, a Utah corporation. (Company's Exhibit 1.)
The Combined Metals Reduction Company will
hereinafter be designated as the "Company."
The Industrial Commission of Utah will hereinafter
be designated as the "Commission."
The transcript of the hearing in this case will hereinafter be designated as "Tr."
_On the second day of October, 1940, a decision "\\ras
~endered by a representative of the Departm_ent of Placement and Unemployment Insurance holding that the services performed by the "lessees" constituted services performed "in employment" within the provision of the Utah
Unemploym,ent Compensation Law and that they, Steven-
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son and Alverson, ''Tere not "employers" subject to contribution liability within the provision of that Law.
On the third day of October, 1940, a representative
of the Department of Placement and Unemployment Insurance rendered a decision of similiar effect finding that
the Combined Metals Reduction Company was the "employer" and the "lessees" and, any individuals hired by
them, ,,~ere "in employment" while performing services
in accordance with the lease agreement herein referred
to. The Company was required to file necessary reports
on this employment with the Commission. The Company
and the "lessees," by their attorney, disagreed with these
decisions, and on the eighth day of October, 1940, filed
appeals. The causes were joined by stipulation.
On the tenth day of October, 1940, a hearing was
held before the Appeal Tribunal, and on the fifteenth
day of October, 1940, the Appeal Tribunal rendered a
decision finding that:
"1. Under the facts presented in this case Stevenson and Alverson were 'in employment' with the
Combined Metals Reduction Company during the
period of time in question within the meaning of
Section 19(j) (l) of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law.
"2. Stevenson and Alverson performed a personal
service for the Combined ~fetals Reduction Company for wages within the meaning of Section
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19(j) (5) of the Utah Unemployment Compensation
Law.
"3. -Such services performed by Stevenson and
Alverson for the Combined Metals Reduction Company were not free from control or direction by
the Company under the contract of service within
the meaning of Section 19(j) (5) (a) of the Utah
Unemployment Compensation Law.

"4. The services performed by Stevenson and Alverson were performed within the usual course
of the Company's business and were performed
within the place of business of the Combined
Metals Reduction Company within the meaning
of Section 19(j) (5) (b) of the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Law.
"5. Stevenson and Alverson were not customarily
engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession, or business, within the
meaning of Section 19(j) (5) (c) of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law."
On the eighteenth day of October, 1940, the Combined Metals Reduction Company and Bud T. Stevenson
and John E. Alverson appealed from this decision to the
Industrial Commission of Utah.
On the twenty~eighth day of October, 1940, the Industrial Commission of Utah denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal.
The matter now comes before this Court on a Petition for Writ of Review.
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In their brief (pp. 4-5), the petitioners outline several
propositions:
"(a) That the conclusion reached that Stevenson
and .L~lverson are not employers but are performing services in employment for Combined Metals
Reduction Company is not supported by the facts
and is contrary to law.
"(b) A judicial question is involved, the determination of which is outside and beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
"(c) That Sec. 19(j) Utah Unemployment Compensation Law (Ch 1 Special Session 1936, Amd
Ch 43, 1937 and Ch 52, 1939) is invalid under Sec.
23, Art. VI, Constitution of Utah, as to title of
amendatory acts.
"(d) Also that said Utah Unemployment Compensation Law is violative of Federal and State
Constitutions, as unreasonably depriving parties
of the right to contract."
They state that all of these propositions will be relied
upon by the lessor and only (a) and (d) by the "lessees."
The Commission takes the position, however, that
its decision is correct and contends:
1. That the "lessees" were "in employment" within the meaning of Section 19 (j) of the Utah
Unemployment Compensation Law.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

b

2. The Commission properly exercised jurisdic-

tion over the matters invloved.
3. That Section 19(j) of the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Law (Chapter 1, Special Session, 1936, amended by Chapter 43, Laws of
Utah, 193?, and Chapter 52, Laws of Utah,
1939) is valid under Sec. 23, Art. VI, Constitution of Utah, as to title of amendatory acts.
4. That the ·utah Unemployment Compensation
Law does not violate the State and Federal
Constitutions by depriving the parties of their
right to contract.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE

"LESSEES" WERE "IN EMPLOYMENT" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW.
A. The legislative history, language, and plan of
of the statute clearly contemplate coverage
under the Law broader in scope than the
traditional common law relationship of master
and servant.

The Unemployment Compensation Law as originally
enacted by the legislature in 1936 (Laws of Utah, Special
Session, 1936, Chapter 1) defined "employment" in Section 19(g) thereof in the following terms:
"Employment means service; including service in
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interstate commerce, performed for wages or under
any contract of hire, written or oral, express or
implied, which service (1) is performed in this
state by an individual, exclusive, however, of any
service within this state which is incidental to
the individual's service performed elsewhere; or
(2) is performed elsewhere but is incidental to an
individual's service in this state; ... "
Under this definition it might have been argued that
~overage under the Law was not defined in precise terms,
and it might have been urged that it alluded to the traditional common law master and servant .relationship.
See Texas Company v. Wheeless, (Miss. 1939), 18?' So. 880.
In 193?', the Legislature of this State felt impelled
to change this definition and to ascribe to the term "employment" a more precise meaning and to give to it a
scope wide enough to cover thereunder persons other than
those who are servants under common law concepts.
In Section 19(j) (1), Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 193?',
"employment" is redefined as follows:
"
service, including service in interstate
commerce, performed for wages or under any
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied."
It added the provision that, regardless of whether the
relationship between an individual and the unit for which
services were performed was that of master and servant
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or principal and independent contractor, all services
performed for wages shall constitute "employment" unless
the circumstances under which the services were per..
formed met three named conditions for exclusion. The
provision thus added reads (Section 19(j) (5)):
"Services performed by an individual for wages
shall be deemed to be employment subject to this
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction
of the commission that"(a) such individual has been and will continue
to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract of service and in fact; and
"(b) such service is either outside. the usual course
of the business for which such service is performed or that such service is performed outside
of all the places of business of the enterprise for
which such service is performed; and
" (c) such individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or business."
This change in the definition of "employment" obviously flowed from a change in intent. A comparison
of the definition as written by the Legislature shows
that it ·adopted standards which were wholly unlike
those used to determine employment under traditional
common law and master and servant concepts for the
purpose of determining coverage under the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law; in other words, the statute
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specifies only three criteria to be considered, and a determination that a relationship does not conform to any
single one of these is sufficient to create statutory "employment."
The courts have so generally recognized that the
statutory criteria in the various unemployment compensation la'\TS should be followed without reference to any
previous common law concepts that the rule has now
become definitely established. See Globe Grain & Milling
Company v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, 98 Utah
36, 91 P. (2d) 512; Creameries of America, Inc. v. The
Industrial Commission of Utah, 98 Utah 571, 102 P. (2d)
300: Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. The Industrail Commission of Utah, (__ __________ Utah.......... ..), 102 P.
{2d) 30'7; National Tunnel and Mines Company v. The
Industrial Commission of Utah, C. .... ______ Utah............), 102 P.
{2d) 508; Unemployment Compensation Commission of
lVorth Carolina v. jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co.,
215 N. C. 4'79, 2 S .. E. (2d) 584; Industrial Commission of
Colorado v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
103 Colo. 550, 88 P (2d) 560; Equitable Life Ins. Co. of
Iowa v. Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado,
(Colo. October 16, 1939), 95 P. (2d) 4; McDermott v. State
of Washington, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568; Georgia
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation v. Young, 10 S.
E. (2d) 412.
B. The relationship between the "lessees" and the
Company constituted "emplyoment" as defined
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1n Section 19(j) (5) of the Law.
The three statutory criteria in Section 19 (j) (5) are
1n the conjunctive. A showing of conformity with all
three is a prerequisite to an exemption of coverage under
the Law.
1. The Industrial Commission reasonably held that
the Combined Metals Reduction Company failed to satisfy the tests for exclusion as set out in Subsection (a)
of that Section which required a showing that:
"Such individual has been and will continue to
be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract
of service and in fact . . . '.' (Italics ours.)
To conform with this condition, the party claiming exemption from the Law must show not only that under the
contract of employment the principal has not exercised
and does not have the right to exercise control over the
performance of service, but that the person performing
the service is free from control or the possibility of control in the future both under the contract and in fact.
I

The statutory test above cited is considerably different from the test employed at common law to determine
the existence of the master and servant relationship in
that there is absent therefrom the factor of control over
the details of the services performed which is commonly
referred to in the Restatement of the Law of Agency.
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Subsection (a) of the statutory test contains a positive
requirement that the individual performing services be
free from control over his performance if exemption is to
be granted. Under the statute, it is unnecessary to determine what is a detail and what is "satisfaction with a result." The statutory relationship exists if the employer
has a general control over the service performed. Such
general control for the purposes of the statutory standard
is present when the manner and means of performance
are either predetermined by contract, necessarily resulting
from the circumstances under which the serivces are performed, or flow from the economic relationship which the
persons performing the services bear to the enterprise for
which they are performed.
In recognition of this difference between the statutory test provided in Section 19(j) (5) (a) and the common
law test relating to control, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550,
88 P. (2d) 560, with respect to a statutory definition of
employment identical with that contained in the Utah
statute stated:
"The first condition in the statutory test relates
to freedom of control and direction over the performance of services, both under contract and in
fact. The test of freedom is either under contract
or fact. Does the company control and direct the
performance of services, or will it have the right
to do so under the contract, if it desires to do so?
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We are not here concerned with details but with
general control. The possibility of control in the
future is as important as an actual control at the
present.
'•In discussing the evidence we shall be controlled
primarily by the undisputed facts, such as the
contracts and the 'Rules and Instructions' governing the persons involved herein in their relations
with the company. The question of control and
direction, as set forth in section 19 (g) (5), is not
a matter of degree. Undoubtedly, it relates to general control. It is not satisfied by some 'detail' in
which the individual may be free to exercise his
own judgment. The power to terminate a contract
for personal service at any time without liability
is an important factor in arriving at a conclusion
as to whether the individual is free of .control and
direction, 'because the right immediately to discharge involves the right of control.' Industrial
Com. v~ Bonfils, '78 Colo. 306, 308, 241 Pac. ?35.'.
(Italics supplied.)
The view expressed by the Colorado court with
~espect to the significant differences between the common
law test of control and the statutory test was adpoted by
a Wisconsin court. See Wisconsin Bridge & Iron (yo. v.
Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, et al., 290 N. W. 199,
233 Wis. 46?. In the course of interpreting statutory
language identical with Section 19(j) (5) (a) the Wisconsin court said:
"For purposes of the present decision, we need
not go into all the points wherein the present legislative definition .of employment departs from
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prior accepted standards. For instance, it has been
regarded-and must still be so viewed under the
workmen's compensation law-that lack of right
to control is what precludes, in essence, the employment status. But by the first test of exclusion
prescribed in 108.02(5) (a), it must be established
that there is freedom from control not only (1) under the contract but also (2) in fact. Furthermore
there must be established not only freedom from
control in the past but that the individual 'will
continue to be free from the employer's control
or direction . . . '" (Italics supplied.)
If, therefore, the power of control exists under the contract~ or in fact, proof of the extent of its actual exercise
or even proof of its non-exercise is wholly immaterial.
The statute looks to control which may be exercised in the
future and it is sufficient under the statute to constitute
employment if the employer has the power, if he chooses
to exercise it, over the performance of service at any
time during the continuance of the relationship. See also
Creameries of America, Inc. v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, supra; Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, supra; Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Commission of the State of Colo., supra.
In the case of the National Tunnel and Mines Company, supra, Chief Justice Moffat said and we quote:
'"·"'j

I

"Under the aforesetforth provisions of the leases,
- there are definite provisions made for the control
and direction over the performance of the service
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both under the contract of hire and in fact. The
only evidence that there is such a contractual
relationship as a leasor-lessee relationship is found
in the introductory provisions wherein it is stated
the plaintiff does 'hereby grant, demise and let
unto said Lessee that portion of the company's
mining property situated . . .' It is specifically
provided that the leasor reserves the property and
the right of property in and to all ores extracted
from said 'demised' premises. There is provided in
the lease a general right of control and direction
over the relationship created under the contract.
The claimant meets the requirements for one eligible for benefits. See Pottordorff v. Fidelity Coal
Mining Co., 86 Kans. 774, 122 P. 120; Industrial
Commission v. Bonfils, 78 Col. 306, 241 P. 735;
McDermott v. State et al., 196 Wash. 261, 82 P.
(2d) 568. A contrary result was reached, though
the same principles of law were applied, because
the element of control was lacking in the case of
Texas Co. v. Wheeless, ............Miss ............ , 18'7 So. 880."
As in the record of the National Tunnel and Mines
Company case, the record in the instant case was that
the "lessees" were not either under their contract with
the company or, in fact, free from control of the possibility of such control in the future.
The Industrial Commission was not unreasonable in
holding that the Company had failed to meet the test
as provided by Section 19(j) (5) (a).
Under the terms o{ the so-called lease agreement
(Company's Exhibit 1), the Company secured the per-
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formance of ,v-eil defined services by the claimant and
did not, in a strict sense of the word, create a right or
interest in the property to which the claimant was given
a so-called property right.A review of both the contract
and the transcript indicates that the most that can be
said of the lease in the sense of creating a right or interest in the property is that it assigns the miners to
work in a particular portion of the mine, and that it
specifies what otherwise would be implied that, namely,
while performing services at the assigned place, at times
and in the manner determined by the Company, the
miner is not to be considered as a trespasser. Such is the
net effect of the use of the real property terminology in
the contract. Moreover, this terminology amounts to no
more than a specification of an incident of every employment contract; each such contract impliedly permits
the individual performing services to come and remain
on the employer's premises in the course of performing
services. Section 304 of Tiffany, Real Property, states this
self-evident principle:
"A contract of lodging also giving not an exclusive
right to a part of the premises, but merely a right
to enter thereon and use them for certain purposes
is in the· nature of a license, and not a lease. Likewise, the permission generally tacit, given to an
employee or other person having business with the
owner of the land to enter on the land for the
purpose of transacting such business creates the
relationship of licensor and licensee."
The specification in the employment contract of
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this tacit immunity of the employee with respect to his
employer's property does not change the relationship nor
affect the application of the statutory definition of employment. Of course, it is not contended that all bona
fide leases of mining property create the statutory employment relationship; nevertheless, it should he apparent
that the mere use of leasehold terminology should not he
permitted to obscure the employment relationship. See
National Tunnel and Mines Company v. The Industrial

Commission of Utah, supra; Creameries of America, Inc.
v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, supra; Salt Lake
Tribune Publishing Company v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, supra; McDermott v. Washington, supra;
Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, supra.
In an enterprise of any size the factory worker IS
assigned to a particular department or machine, a waiter
to particular tables, and a retail clerk to particular
counters. The perference of the employee may be given
considerable weight by the employer in making the assignment, but in those cases and in the present case (Company's Exhibit 1), the employees cannot, without permission, leave their assigned post nor enter the premises
except during the hours of business and in accordance
'vith the practices established by the employer. Under
the lease, the "lessees" were in the same situation as employees generally. They acquired no exclusive right to possession of any part of the mine. Anyone else whom the
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employer permitted could enter on and use the premises
and the lessees, like any employees, were required to adjust their activities to such use by others. See Company's
Exhibit 1 (para. 6) :

"RIGHT-0 F- WAY. 6. Lessee

shall allow the
Comu.any or agents of said Company to have at
all times access to all parts of said premises for
the purpose of inspecting, surveying, or sampling
the same. Said lease is to be subject to a right-ofway for the Company or its employees or its other
leessees or their employees through all workings
existing or that may be made within said prem ..
. ''
1ses.

The "lessees" not only acquired no title to the real
estate but acquired no title to the minerals after they
were extracted (Tr. 30-31), (Company's Exhibit 1, p. 8),
and their presence in the mine was merely an incident to
the general plan for operating the employer's enterprise.
(Tr. 24). The terms of the lease sustain this conclusion.
Under the lease the "lessees" were merely given the use
of the premises in order that they might carry on the
business of the Company. Indeed, the occupancy alone
was of no value to the Company apart from the conduct
of its business at the premises. The "lessees" were entitled to the "use" of the permises only for such purpose,
and while there they were required to carry on activities
in conformance with the Company's general operations.
(Tr. 27, 28)

"Q. You mentioned that there were ten or twelve
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sets of lessees in the Queen Tunnel?
"A. I believe I said eight or ten.
"Q. What provision is made for coordinating the
activities of those men so they won't interfere
with each other on transporting material into
the mine or out of the mine?
"A. Well, that is more or less an arrangement
between the individual lessees themselves to
coordinate their operations and jointly with
the Company. In other words, if several
lessees happen to have a shipment ready all
at the same time, they would have to arrange
among themselves who would be shipped first
or make some arrangement for their turn.
There is no supervision by the Company of
the lessees' activities. They handle their own
affairs and have to make their own arrange..
ments as to their transporation and as to their
turn to get transportation when they have
shipments available.
"Q. In the event lessees cannot agree, what
occurs?
"A. Well, in that case I guess there would be
an argument and it would depend on the
system how it would turn out."

*

*

*

*

"Q. Does the Company maintain a superintendent or mining boss who, I was going to say,
well, use the work 'sup.ervise' operations in
the Queen Tunnel?
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"A. Let me ans''?er that in a little different way.
The Company has a full mining organization
at the property. This organization, provided
by the Company to handle the entire property, consists of superintendent, chief bosses,
mine clerks, and the customary organization
that is set up to handle mining property. But
as far as lessees on Queen Tunnel are concerned, the Company does not attempt to
supervise their work."
The collection of "rental" would have been Impossible except with reference to the services performed by
the "lessees." The Company was mainly interested, since
its income was derived from the profits on ore shipments,
in producing as much ore as possible. (Tr. 24)
Under the authorities, it has been generally held
that where the use of the premises is connected with,
and incidental to tP.e operations of the business of the
lessor and is calculated to enable a more convenient performance of that business, the relationship of employer
and employee exists even under the common law test of
the existence of that relationship. See McQuade v. Em-

mons, 38 N. J. Law 397; Waller v. Morgan, 57 Ky. 136;
State v. Curtis, 20 N. C. 363; Neal v. Bellamy, 73 N. C.
384; Hayward v. Rogers, 73 N. C. 320; Tucker v. Park
Yarn ~fill Co., 140 S. E. 744. See also, Bowman v. Bradley,
151 Pa. 352, 24 A. 1062; Davis v. Long, 178 N. W. 936.
It is clear that the "lessees" were not either under
their contract or, in fact, free from control or from the
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possibility of such control in the future. The Company
required that the "lessees" enter upon the said premises
within fourteen days from the date of the signing of the
lease, and to do not less than forty shifts of work each
ancl every month during the life of the lease and to work
the same in a good and miner-like fashion and in a manner necessary to good and economical mining. (Company's
Exhibit 1.)
The Hlessees" were required to post and keep posted,
at the entry of all workings, notices to the effect that
such mines were being worked by the said ''lessees."
(Company's Exhibit 1). The "lessees" were required to
regularly report to the Company the number of shifts
worked each month and the names of the individuals
performing the work during such shifts.
The company retained the right to determine what
individuals could be hired by Stevenson and Alverson.
(Tr. 38)

uQ. When you hired any individual to perform
services on the lease, was it required that you
secure the approval of the Company?
"A. (Stevenson) Well, it was required in the lease,
but never was done."
The '"'lessees" were required (Company's Exhibit 1.
"Work Requirements"):
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•·.
to personally supervise the work and assist
in the performance thereof and not to employ or
bring upon the premises any persons objectionable
to the Company." (Italics ours.)
On Page 13 (Plaintiffs' Brief) after referring to the
Federal and State regulations and the penalties imposed
for shipping '"hot ore" the plaintiffs said:
"
surely there can be no impropriety in
requiring that lessees 'personally supervise the
work and assist in performance thereof.'"
While there is no "impropriety" in such a requirement,
as is embodied in the lease agreement, the circumstance
that the personal supervision performed on behalf of
the Company is made necessary by reason of police regulations does not mean that the services do not constitute
"employment." An employee on a railroad would be nonetheless an employee by reason of the fact that the Federal and State governments, by regulation, require the
railroad company to supervise the performance of his
services.
On Pages 16-19 of their brief, plaintiffs argue, if
the "lessees" performed "personal services" they did so
on their "own account" and not for the Company. In
reply to this argument, we first point out to this Court
that "employment" is defined in Section 19(j) (6) (p) of
the Law as follows:
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"(p) 'Wages' means all remuneration payable for
personal services, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration payable in any medium other than cash . . "
and not as quoted in plaintiff's brief at Page 1'7:
"'Wages' are defined in the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Act as all conpensation payable for
personal services rendered for another under a
contract of hire, express or implied."
They go on to say in plaintiff's brief at Page 1'7:
"Any remuneration therefore, whatever its form,
may constitute wages if it is received for personal
services rendered for another."
We respectfully call the attention of this Court to the
fact that nowhere in the Law does the definition of
"services" or "wages" contain the words "for another."
The contention of the plaintiffs appears to be based
on a misapprehension that if a direct advantage or benefit inures to any one other than the alleged employer,
the employment relation may not exist.
We fail to find any basis for the argument either
that the "lessees" were perforn1ing services solely for
themselves and not for the Company or that the "lessees".
are not "in employment" because the services were rendered "for their own account."
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In vie"~ of the specific service requirement as set
out in the lease agreement under the title of "Work Requirements:" (Company's Exhibit 1).
"WORK REQUIREMENTS. 1. The Lessee agrees
to enter upon said premises within 14 days from
the date of the signing of this lease, and to do not
less than 40 shifts of tvork each and every month
during the life of this lease, and work the same in
good and miner-like fashion and in a manner
necessary to good and economical mining, and
properly timber the same where necessary, so as
to take out the greatest amount of ore possible
with due regard to the safety, development and
preservation of said premises; to personally supervise the work and assist in the performance thereof
and not to employ or bring upon the premises
any persons objectionable to the Company."
(Italics ours.}
the Company certainly cannot deny that the lease agreement provided a definite performance of work and that
such work constituted a service.
Actually, the "lessees" did perform services under
the above-mentioned contract, and they did receive remuneration from the Company itself by virtue of the
circumstances under which the Company controlled the
shipments of ore and the moneys received therefrom.
The opinion of this Court in the case of The Fuller
Brush Company v. The Industrial Com1nision of Utah,
C. .......... Utah .......... J, 104 P. (2d) 201, as quoted by plaintiff's
in their brief (pp.17 -18) said:
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"That claimant performed personal service is not
in dispute, but there is a dispute as to whether
such services were performed for plaintiff or for
self, and as to whether he received wages therefore or profits on sales. In other words, was the
relationship between plaintiff and claimant that
of employer and employee or that of vendor and
vendee? The finding being positive and definite
that claimant in the performance of the personal
service was free of all direction and control -by
plaintiff, both in fact and under his contract of
hire, it must follow of necessity that he did not
perform service for plaintiff under a contract
of hire or for wages, and therefore the relationship
was one that never came within the scope of the
act because he was not in employment that would
bring him within the act, to wit, rendering personal services for another under a contract of hire
or for wages,
"
it cannot be applied to this case because the two are not
analogous.
I

In The Fuller Brush Company case~ supra, the
Court found:
". . . that claimant in the performance of personal service was free of all direction and control
by plaintiff both in fact and under his contract
of hire . . ."
and reasoned that since there was no control then it
co11ld not be said that the plaintiff rendered personal
services for another.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
We again call this Court's attention to the fact that
the words "for another" are not contained in the definition of H"~ages" embodied in the Utah Unemployment
Compensation La"~. We "~ish to point out that the instant case differs from the case of The Fuller Brush
Company, supra, in that Stevenson and Alverson were
performing services under the direction and control of
the Company ''Tithin the provisions of the lease agreement (Company's Exhibit 1), and that, therefore, the
argument advanced in the former case cannot apply in
the matter now before this Court.
This Court in The Fuller Brush Company case, supra,
in order to find an answer to the question of whether or
not the relationship between the plaintiff and the claimant is that of vendor and vendee, used a test which was
similar, if not identical, with the test as set out in Section 19(j) (5) (a) of the Law.
Because the lease agreement In the instant case,
which definitely retains such right to direct and control
the "lessees," is to be considered by Section 19(j) (5) (a}
or a similar test, then it would necessarily follow that
the application of the test laid down in the case of The
Fuller Brush Company, supra, must lead this Court to
the conclusion· that the relationship between the parties
was not that of lessor and lessee but that services performed by Stevenson and Alverson were services performed "in employment" within the meaning of Section
19(j) of the Law.
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The plaintiffs in their brief (p.19) state that:
"
the relationship between the parties was
not that of employer and employee but that of
lessor and lessee . . ."
and, that:
"There is no occasion to go further; no occasion
to inquire as to whether, had the lessees been employees of the lessor, they would have come within
the provisions of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law; to inquire as to the appilcability
of Section 19 (j) (5) since ·as this Honorable Court
has pointed out, (apparently refers to the case of
The Fuller Brush Company) that section becomes
material only after it has been determined that
personal services were rendered for another for
wages or under a contract of hire." (Italics ours.)
The plaintiffs without applying any test, thought
process, or reasoning whatsoever have reached the conclusion that here we have a relationship of lessor and
lessee which exists for no other reason than that it
arises under an agreement entitled "lease agreement."
We contend that there can be no real determination
of a relationship unless that determination is based on
a line of thought pro.cesses which is governed by a particular set of tests, reasons, or rules. This Court in the
case of The Fuller Brush Company case, supra, based its
findings on a test of control.
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'Ve submit that if the plaintiffs are relying on the
rule laid do'\~n in The Fuller Brush Company case, supra,
then the plaintiffs n1ust fail in their contention that the
services performed by Stevenson and Alverson were not
serYices performed "in employment."
2. The Industrial Commission reasonably held that
the Company failed to satisfy the test for exclusion a~
set out in Subsection (b) of Section 19(j) (5) of the Law

which required a sho'"~ing that:
"(b) such service is either outside the usual course
of the business for which such service is performed
or that such service is performed outside of all
the places of business of the enterprise for w-hich
such service is performed; and "
We submit that the services performed by the
"lessees" were services performed in the usual course of
the Company's business which consisted of mining and
milli~g lead~ zinc, gold, and silver ores.
The "lease agreement" contains provisions designed
to secure the performance of services in conformity
with the usual operations of the Company. (Tr. 24, 28,
30, 31, 35~ 38, 39) (Company's Exhibit 1.)
As we have hereinbefore pointed out, there is no
relationship created under the "lease agreement" which
was in any way inconsistent with the employment relationship that "\\-ras_ also:'. created. In that agreement, the
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Company reserved among other things, a right-of-way
over the "lease" for not only the Company's employees
and agents hut, also, for any or all of its other "lessees"
or their members. (Company's Exhibit 1, para. 6.)
It is immaterial that many of the controls set out
in the "lease agreement" carried out a general theme that
the work was to be performed in a "good and miner-like
fashion." As a matter of fact, the provision that the
work was to be performed in a "good and miner-like
fashion" reserved to the Company the right to at all
times control the actual performance of services so that
they would conform with the usual methods of operation
of the Company's business.
The "lessees" were actually performing only a part
of the business of mining; the other necessary functions
such as tramming of waste and ore and the marketing of
the same, were performed by the Company's employees.
The rights of possession granted the "lessees" under the
lease agreement were clearly those rights which were
immediately incident to the performance of the prospecting for and the mining of ore on the property of the
Company.
The Commission reasonably found that the Com·
pany failed to make a showing that the services were
not performed in the place of business of the Company
and that, as a matter of fact, it is clear that the lease agreement in this case was drawn to secure the performance
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of services on the Company\; operated porperty and was
not i~tended to convey any interest in the "lease block"
,,,hich could in any ,,~ay be inconsistent with the usual
course of the business of the Company in the place of
business of the Company. (Tr. 2?)

"Te think the transcript at page 24 makes this point
clear:
"Q. \\1hen you say that the Company has no
Company operations in the Queen Tunnel,
you do not intend to convey the impression
that the Company has no interest in the operations of that mine?
"A. If I can make myself clear, our interest in the
Queen Tunnel area is to have the lessees produce ore from which the Company derives
by royalty payments by the lessee on the ore
produced by the lessee, and it is to the ComP?ny's interest to have the lessees produce
as much ore as possible because the proceeds
of the lessees' operation are split on a royalty method between the Company and the
lessee~ and in order to facilitate the operation
of the lessees the Company has provided
some transportation facilities on the Queen
Tunnel level in the form of a storage battery
locomotive hauling, which I mentioned, and
to that extent the Company does work in
the Queen Tunnel area, but as far as mining
ore is concerned on its own account through
employees paid day's wages, the Company
has no mining operations in that area."
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3. The Commission reasonably concluded that the
Company failed to show that the "lessees" were cus-

tomarily engaged in such an independently established
trade, occupation, profession, or business as was contemplated by Subsection (c) of Section 19(j} (5) of the
Law.
The plaintiffs in their brief (pp. 22-23) maintain
that the "lessees" were "customarily" engaged in such
tine of work, and that for a period of two and one-half
years before the hearing of the Appeal Tribunal one of
the "lessees" had been engaged in leasing. Plaintiffs further state that because Stevenson and Alverson had been
engaged on this lease since June, 1938, they were therefore exempt within the meaning of Subsection (c) of Section 19(j) (5), and in connection therewith indicate that
Stevenson and Alverson were operating as a so-called copartnership.
The fact that Stevenson and Alverson engaged in
work as "partners" need not be considered as a conclusive indication of a business unit or enterprise. It has
a more ready explanation in the usual custom followed
by~ so-called lessees in the mining industry. In practically
all leases there is a period in which the lessee or the
lessees must perform "dead work," i. e., vvork concerned
with the development of the leased premises in which no
paying ore is obtained. Normally, too, the usual lessee
is unable to pay n1iners wages to any individual performing services on the lease with then1 ~ they therefore
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arrange to secure such help by entering upon the lease
as " part ners. "
The so-called partnership arrangement, therefore,
is seen as n1erely a convenient "~ay of securing the performance of services "~ithout an obligation to pay wages
on the part of any one of the so-called lessees.
The language of the Law provides that the individual
be independently established in, as well as customarily
engaged in, and, therefore, the burden is on the plaintiffs to show that the "lessees" were customarily established in the business of producing and selling ore independently of any connection with the Company. Subsection (c) does not require that the "lessees" be engaged
in another business, but it does require that the business
in which they are engaged be established independently
of their single connection with any one company.
There can be no such independently established
business if its origin and termination depend entirely
upon a particular connection. It is significant that the
statute requires that the business be "independently
established" and not that the business be merely independent.
The nature of the establishment governs whether
the individual is. subject to the type of risk which should
be covered by unemployment compensation, and whether
the individual performs services in a business so estab-
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lished that notwithstanding the fact that a particular
connection is severed, he is still in a position to continue
to operate on his own accout earning a livelihood from
all who choose to use his services or buy his products.
Thus to meet this "test" relating to the independent
establishment of a business or trade an individual must
be so set up in that business or trade that he is not
dependent upon the continuance of his connection with
a single company. He must have the power to perform
the duties incident to his business or trade in accordance
with his own methods; he must be free to buy his equipment, tools, or merchandise in the competitive market;
the good will of his business must be his own, transferable at his pleasure, and for a consideration satisfactory to him; he must be able to select and determine for
himself the desirability and efficiency of his own equipment and employees; the continuation of his business
must in no way be dependent upon the will of another,
and he must be able to determine the extent to which
services will be performed for others while his performance of services for any one company is in progress.
It is clear from the record in this case that the
"lessees" are not independently established. No independently established business would appear to be so
subservient to a single employer for the disposal of its
products and for the determination of the length of
time during which it shall operate. The mere fact that the
"lessees" because of their shift (Company's Exhibit 1)
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were required to be on the job personally each day, negatives the possibility of the "lessees" holding themselves
out as being able to undertake the operation of mines
generally.
The Colorado Supreme Court in the case of Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado v. Northwestern
Nlutual Life Insurance Company, supra, said:
"The third test as to exemption from coverage
is that the 'individual' is customarily engaged
independently in an established trade, occupation,
profession or business. This would necessitate a
showing by the company to the satisfaction of the
Commission that its agents are established in the
business of selling insurance, independent of whatever connection they may have with the company."
(Italics ours.)
See also Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, supra; Pond v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, et al., (Michigan Circuit
Ct.: 1939); Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado, supra.
The foregoing presents no novel interpretation of
the lease. In cases where the power and right of control
vested in a lessor were less clear than in this case and
under statutes providing for less extensive coverage than
that provided under the Unemployment Compensation
Law, "leases" 'vere held to create the employment relationship. Martin v. Republic Steel Co., (Ala. 1933), 146
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So. 276; Pottorff v. Fidelity Coal Mines Co., 86 Kan. 774,
122 P. 120. In the Pottorff case, the court said (at p. 122):
"Without further citation from the multitude of
authorities on this subject, it only remains to apply
these principles to the contract in question. First
as to time: The contractor may have the benefit
of the agreement for five years or five days, or
any shorter period at the will of the company. He
must quit should 'the working of the mines not
he agreeable' to the company, with no further
right than to load the product mined in 60 days.
But this provision so destructive of independence
is not limited in its effect to time merely, for the
right to thus summarily annul the agreement
necessarily carries with it the potency of compelling such means and methods as will make the conduct of the work agreeable to the company. While
the contract does not state that Barrett shall observe the methods and use the means prescribed
by the company or suffer forfeiture, yet the company may annul the contract at its option if a
failure to observe its directions in these matters
should not be agreeable. The use of the word
'agreeable' seems naturally to apply to such conduct of the work as might cause danger or bring
disaster to the miners or the property. But whether
such a contingency was in mind or not, the sweeping reservation includes certainly the right to interpose whenever negligent methods 'vill imperil
life or porperty, and under the clause in question
the company might have compelled the contractor
to exercise proper care in the use of electrical applicances or to have ceased their use altogether by
terminating the contract. In the Nelson case it was
said that, if the Cement Company had retained
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the right to discharge at will one of the contractors,
they ,,~ere not independent. Here the right of
annulment, equivalent to a discharge, is expressly
reserved in the contract.
"The contractor does not appear to be independent
in other respects. The output of the mine is absolutely controlled by the company. It may operate the mines at full capacity or shut down entirely according to its own 'requirements and demands.' . . .
"It is true that the effect of a contract is not to
be determined by the phraseology of detached
parts, but the entire instrument as a connected
whole, and each part as affected by every other
part, yet in view of the provisions referred to and
the spirit and purpose of the agreement as we
interpret it in the light of the business to be operated under it, it is held that Barrett is not an
independent contractor, and that the contract
referred to is not a defense to this action."
In the Martin case, the court said at (p. 278):
"If, however, the right to supervise, direct and
control the employee is, under our statute, determinative, in any way, of whether the contract
creates the relation of employer and employee, the
contract in this case cannot but impress the judicial mind that the reserved right of the defendant to terminate the contract, and thereby the
right to discharge the employee, when, and in
the event "it appears to said engineer or superintendent that said second party or any of his employees or associates has been guilty of violating

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

any of the rules of first party of carelessness or
'incapacity,' is of considered weight as tending to
show that the employee is not an independent
contractor. Bristol & G. Co. v. Industrial Commission et al., 292 Ill. 16, 126 N. E. 599; Messmer
case, note 19 Ann. Cas. page 18; Bernauer v. Hartman Steel Co., 33 Ill. App. 491; Adams Express
Co. v. Schofield, 111 Ky. 832, 64 S. W. 903; Shea
v. Reems, 36 La. Ann. 966; Keyes v. Second Baptist Church, 99 Me. 308, 59 A. 446; Brackett v.
Lubke, 4 Allen (Mass.) 138, 81 Am. Dec. 694;
Morgan v. Bowman, 22 Mo. 538; Burke v. City,
etc., Contract Co., 133 App. Div. 113, 117 N. Y. S.
400; Dickson v. Hollister, 123 Pa. 421, 16 A. 484,
10 Am. St. Rep. 533; Johnston v. Hostie, 30 U.C.Q.B.
232.
"It cannot be said that the right to terminate a
contract, if it appears to the engineer or superintendent of the owner that the person performing the service has viola ted the rules of the employer, or has been 'guilty of carelessness or incapacity,' does not arm the owner (employer) with
a most potent weapon
enforce the due and
proper execution of the work according to the
contract between the parties. This reserved right
to terminate the contract in the events enumerated,
to our mind, negatives the. idea that the petitioner
was an independent contractor. rfhe true criterion
is not whether the owner did in fact exercise super ..
vision, but rather did he have the right to do so;
did he possess the power to control? Honnold on
Workmen's Compensation, "'Vol. 1~ Page 1.67: State
ex rei. V a. & R. Lake Co. v. District Court, 128
Minn. 43, 150 N. W. 211."

to
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Under Sections 14 and 15 of the "lease agreement"
between the Company and Stevenson and Alverson, the
po"-er to terminate is effectively established as in the
above quoted case. It should not be overlooked that a
primary condition for the existence of the status of an
"independent contractor" unless the contract for services
provides a fixed and definite result upon the completion
of "-hich such person is entitled to the contract price.
See Ludlotv v. Industrial Co1nmission of Utah, 65 Utah
182; 235 P. 84. No such predetermined result existed in
this case. The power of the Company to enforce its will
on matters affecting the manner and means of the performance of services by the "lessees" negatives the existence of a "result."
In Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Bonfils,
78 Colo. 306, 241 P. '735, a workman's compensation case,
the question before the court was whether or not a deceased coal hauler was an employee under section 9 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads as follows: "The term 'employee' shall mean and include: ...
Every person in the service of any other person . . .
under any contract of hire, express or implied ..." The
court said (p. '736):

"A servant is one whose employer has the order
and control of work done by him, and who directs
or may direct the means as well as the end. Arnold
v. Lawrence~ 72 Colo. 328, 530, 213 P. 129. By virtue of its potver to discharge, the company could,
at any moment, direct the minutest detail and
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method of the work. The fact, if a fact, that it
did not do so is immaterial. It is the power of control, not the fact of control, that is the principle
factor in distinguishing a servant from a contractor.
Franklin Coal & Coke Co. v. Ind. Co., 296 Ill. 329,
f29 N. E. 811. The most important point 'in determining the main question (contractor or employee) is the right of either to terminate the relation without liability.' Ind. Com. v. Hammond,
?? Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006. This is a confirmation by
this court of the rule above stated as to control,
because the right immediately to discharge Involves the right of control." (Italics ours.)
C. The lease relationship is not an exclusive one.
Apparently, the plaintiffs in their brief (pp. 9-12)
argue that when a lease agreement is entered into hetween two parties it necessarily creates the relationship
of landlord and tenant and excludes all other relationships. We submit that a true lease does not exist in this
case any more than it did in McDern!ott v. State of Washington, supra; Georgia Bureau of Unemployment Com'pensation v. Young, 10 S. E. (2d) 412; Wyoming U nemployment Compensation Commission v. Tharp; National
Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah!
supra; Bert Baker, Inc. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, (Mich. Cir. Court for Ingham
County, July 15, 1940, C. C. H. Mich. para. 8070) for the
reasons expressed in the opinions in those cases.
The facts that warrant the conclusion that a lease
was entered into also justify the conclusion that coexist-
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ent ~.,.ith the lease there was an ~mployment relationship.
In Hughes v. Cheatham, 5 M. & G. 54, 78, 44 E. C. L. 39,
134 Reprint 479 (quoted in Kerrains v. People, 60 N. Y.
221, 226 and Ofschlager v. Surbeck, 22 Misc. 595, 598, 50
N. Y. S. 862) it was said:
"There is no inconsistency in the relation of master
and servant with that of landlord and tenant."
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the employment relationship referred to in the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Law is not necessarily that of master and
servant at common law but takes in factual situations
beyond the scope of that relationship. It is clear that
a leasehold may coexist with the employment relationship with the result that a Company which considers
itself a lessor will be responsible for the payment of
contributions.
D. A conclusion by a State court that the employment relationship exists within the meaning of the State unemployment compensation
law can have no effect upon the Company's
status under the various Federal laws.
The plaintiffs argue in their brief (pp. 5-8) that a
holding by this Court that the "lessees" are "in employment" within the meaning of the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Law will somehow bring about an adverse
application of the Federal Social Security Act and the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and consequently some
1200 .families in this State will be deprived of the op-
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portunity of being supported by labor 1n a gainful occupation.
We fail to see how the coupling of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law with the Federal Wage
and Hour legislation and the Federal Social Security
Act has any rational basis whatsoever. Certainly, a conclusion by a State court that the employment relationship exists within the meaning of the State unemployment compensation law can have no effect on the Company's status under the Federal ·wage and Hour legislation. Particularly so since the coverage definitions of
the two laws are entirely dissimilar. {See Section 19 (j) (5),
Utah Unemployment Compensation Law, and 29 U.S. C.
A. 203{d) {e) and, in particular, {g); Act of June 25, 1938,
c. 676, para. 3, 52 Stat. 1060.)

It is difficult to imagine any purpose served by
the reference to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
and Col. Fleming's speech at Salt Lake City on October
30, 1940. This Court should not be lead to the conclusion
that the consequences of a decision adverse to the Company will be infinitely more far reaching and cause
much more economic dislocation than might otherwise be
expected. Contrary to the contention of the plaintiffs on
page 8 of their brief, the "Acts" do not "dovetail" in
"their operation and effect," and there is no legal basis
for finding that "the rulings under one Act are persuasive
as to the others." The very least that could be said with
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respect to this rather fantastic application of the canons
of statutory construction is that even within the FederalState program for unemployment compensation the courts
have refused to accord the coverage language in State
unemployment compensation laws the interpretations of
identical language in the Federal laws. Richlow Manufacturing Co. v. Brannaman, 104 P. (2d) 89'7 (1940); Capitol Building and Loan Assn. v. Kansas Commissioner of
Labor and Industry, 83 P. (2d) 106 (1938); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Bashore, 48 Dauph. 59, 10 Atl. (2d)
553 (1940); JVachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of North Carolina, 12
S. E. (2d) 592 (1939).
II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH. ACTED
WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION AS ESTABLISHED
BY THE LAW.
Plaintiffs on page 23 of their brief state:
"
we would say that the representative
order (Record p. 3) requiring Combined Metals
Reduction Company to pay into the Unemployment Compensation Fund the necessary contributions on wages earned by Stevenson and Alverson, and their employees, is without validity."
There seems to be some confusion as to what IS
contained in the representative's order under date of
October 3, 1940: therefore, we quote from that order:
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"Based on facts and information presented to us,
it is the determination of the Commission that
this association of individuals does not constitute
an 'employer,' but rather such individuals are
performing services 'in employment' for the Combined Metals Reduction Company within the
meaning of Section 19(j) of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law (Chapter 52, Laws of
Utah, 1939). You are therefore required to file
with this Department, additional Forms UC-3
Rev., 'Contribution Report,' UC-106, 'Employer's
Annual Report of Wages Payable,' and UC-106-A,
'Employer's Annual Report of Wages Payable to
Each Worker,' on which you report the earnings
of these individuals for all periods in which they
perform services for you.
"You are also liable to pay1nent to the State Tax
Commission of a contribution of 2.7 per cent based
on the earnings of these individuals. You will
be supplied with necessary forms on which to submit supplemental wage information. In the future,
you will include the earnings of these individuals
when filing with this Department your quarterly
Form UC-3 Rev."
We fail to find in this communication any words which
can be construed as requiring the payment of any moneys
into the Unemployment Compensation Fund. All that is
required under this order is that the Combined Metals
Reduction Company file the required forms with the Department of Placement and Unemployment Insurance
showing the earnings of Stev·enson and Alverson for all
periods in which they performed serv~ces for the Company. Certainly there can be no question as to the author-
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ity of the Commission ";here it 1s delegated to so rule
under Section 14(b) of the Law.
The plaintiffs appealed from this order to the Appeal
Tribunal, and the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the ruling
of the representative. The plaintiffs then followed the procedure as outlined in Section 10 of the Law.
In the light of these facts and the further fact that
the Commission has not instituted any civil action for
contributions against the plaintiffs, or any of them, it is
difficult to perceive the relevance or materiality of the
arguments as set out on pages 23 to 26 of plaintiffs' brief.
In enacting the Utah Unemployment Compensation
Law, the Legislature entrusted the administration of the
Law to the Industrial Commission (Section 11); it imposed upon the Commission the duty to administer the
Law; granted it full authority to issue rules and regulations within the framework of the Law in order to accomplish its purposes and further empowered the Commission
"to require such reports" and "make such investigations"
as it might deem necessary to carry out the provisions
of the statute. (Section 11(a).)

Section 14(b) of the Law empowers the Commission
or its authorized representatives to determine the amount
of contributions due from employers and to so notifv
the employers. We quote:
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" ... the commission or its authorized representative, may determine the amount of wages payable
for employment occurring during the period or
periods with respect to which the reports were
or should have been made and the amount of contribution due from such employer on the basis
of such information as it may he able to obtain,
and it shall give written notice of such determina~
tion to the employer . . ."
Section 19(j) (5) of the Law requires the exclusion
from "employment" to he determined by the "Commis·
sion" which in turn is specifically defined by Section
19(£) of the Law to mean the "Industrial Commission;"
thus, by the terms of the statute, the Commission is under
a duty to determine whether services were performed "in
employment."
The Law also provides definite appeal procedures
and such procedures have been followed throughout in
this case.
The plaintiffs, on page 26 of their brief, ask three
questions of this Court which call for wholly declaratory
adjudiciation hearing no relation to the issues involved
in this case.
AS TO QUESTION NO. 1:
"1. Are the District Courts of this State now
without jurisdiction of a controversy between
the Indus trial Comrp_ission and one claiming
not to he an employer?"
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(1) Since the statute provides exclusively for
Supreme Court review of the decisions of the
Commission, there would appear to be no
necessity for the Court to declare whether or
not the District Courts have jurisdiction over
such a controversy as it presented in this
case.

AS TO QUESTION NO.2:
"2. Is an order of the Industrial Commission requiring payment of contributions unqualifiedly invalid?"

(2) It is irrelevent and immaterial inasmuch as
there is no order of the Industrial Commission in this case requiring the payment of contributions.
AS TO QUESTION NO. 3:
"3. That is to say, as we view it, does the Industrial Commission have exclusive jurisdiction
even of judicial questions, in the initial
stages?"
(3) This question may not be answered because it
is apparent that the Commission does not
make any such claim of exclusive jurisdiction in this case as is contemplated by the
question.

III.
THE LAW IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Plaintiffs question the constitutionality of Chapter
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43, Laws of Utah, 1937, particularly with reference to
Section 19 thereof, claiming that said purported amendatory act is in conflict with Sec. 23, Art. VI of the Constitution of the State of Utah which is as follows:

"Except general appropriation bills and bills for
the codification and general revision of Laws, no
bill shall be passed containing more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
The plaintiffs have fully answered their own question by quoting the following passage from this Court's
decision in the case of Globe Grain and Milling Company
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra.
"(6, 7) Petitioner contends that a holding as
above makes the act unconstitutional as contravening fundamental law as contained in Article I,
Section '7 (due process clause), Article I, Section
18 (against impairing the obligations of contract),
Article VI, Section 23 (prohibiting a bill from containing more than one subject) of our State Con ..
stitution and Article 1, Section X (impairing obligations of contract) and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, U. S. C. A. ThiS.
formidable array of assertions of constiutionality
is not supported by the citation of any authorities.
If the contention that the act did not clearly express in its title the subject is good, the act is
unconstitutional regardless of whether we affirm
or reverse the commission's findings. But the title
does not offend in that regard. The subject in regard to which the legislation pertains has been
'clearly expressed in the title.' The subject is 'Unemployment Compensation.' The constitutional
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provision does not require that all the methods
prescribed in the act for carrying out its objects
be reflected in the title, nor all the classes affected
by the act. There may be compensation for some
types of unemployed independent contractors, as
known in the common law concept, provided for
in the act, which would be covered by the subject 'Unemployment Compensation.'" 91 P. (2d)
516. (Italics ours.}
See also Southern Photo and Blueprint Company v. Gore,
114 S. W. (2d) ?96, and Gibson Products Company v.
Jlurphy, 93 Okla. Appel. 240, 100 P. (2d) 453.
Plaintiffs on pages 32 and 33 of their brief, argue
that the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law incorporates an. unconstitutional classification or violates the
due process of law requirement by providing that:
j

" . . liability for contributions would attach
as against a large class not properly includable in
the term 'employer' but whose liability would be
created under the new definition, based upon contractual relationships which hitherto had never
been considered as constituting the relationship of
employer and employee."
It can no longer be questioned that a legislature has
the power to enact a statutory plan to anticipate and
alleviate the evils of unemploy~ent by providing unemployment benefits for those who have worked for
others·, and are presently willing to work, but cannot
find work. Chamberlin v. Andrews, 2'71 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E.
(2d) 22, aff'd 299 U. S. 515; Gillum v. johnson, 92 Cal.
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647, 62 P. (2d) 1037; Howes Bros. v. Unemploymen~ Com-

pensation Commission, (Mass. 1936), 5 N. E. (2d) 720 cert.
denied 300 U.S. 658; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke

Co., 301 U. S. 495; Bee land JiVholesale Co. v. Kaufman,
(Ala. 1937), 174 So. 516; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U. S. 548; Southern Photo & Blueprint Co. v. Gore,
supra; Tatum et al. v. Mississippi Unemployment Compensation Commission, 180 Miss. 800, 178 So. 95. The purpose and objectives of the unemployment compensation
law being within the powers of the State, the classifications contained in the statute embodying the plan must,
therefore, he tested by the same basic principles which
underlie consideration of the plan when their validity is
assailed. These tests of validity are applicable regardless
of whether the contributions exacted under an unemployment compensation system are viewed as a tax on
a particular class, namely on those who engage the services of others under circumstances where the continuance
of the employment is dependent upon the will of the
employer; or whether the classifications are regarded
as being based on some relationship between those who
are required to contribute and the evil sought to be
remedied. Under either view, the question is simply one
concerning the legislative discretion to select those subjected to an exaction. With respect to the power of a
legislature to select the classes to he taxed for the purpose of creating an unemployment insurance fund, the
New York Court of Appeals in Chamberlin v. Andrews,
supra, said (p~ 14):
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_"Whether we consider such legislation as we have
here a tax measure or an exercise of the police
power seems to me to be immaterial. Power in the
state must exist to meet such situations, and it
can only be met by raising funds to tide over the
unemployment period. Money must be obtained
and it does not seem at all arbitrary to c·)nfine
the tax to a business and employment out of which
the difficulty principally arises.
"It is said that this is taxation for the benefit of
a special class, not the public at large, and thus
the purpose is essentially private. The Legislature,
after investigation, has found tile facts to be that
those who are to receive benefits under the act
are the ones most likely to be out of employment
in times of depression. The courts cannot investigate these facts and should not attempt to do so."
'

l

In Beeland Wholesale Co. v; Kaufman, supra, the
Alabama Supreme Court sustained the contributions as
a tax and justified the payment of benefits as proper
expenditures to promote· the safety, welfare, and health
of the residents of the State. In Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., supra, the Supreme Court of the United
States sustained the contributions as a tax and the payment of benefits as expenditures designed to effect a
public purpose. The Court said (pp. 508, 509):
)

"As the present levy has all the indicia of a tax,
and is of a type traditional in the history of AngloAmerican legislation, it is within state taxing
power, and it is immaterial whether it is called
an excise or by another name. See Barwise v.
Sheppard, 299 U. S. 33, 36. Its validity under the
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Federal Constitution principles
state taxation."

IS

applicable to

Under such circumstances it would be within the
power of the State to use funds derived from any source
for the purpose of maintaining an unemployment insurance plan, and the fact that the source may, in a particular statute, be identified with a particular group of
taxpayers~ would not affect the validity of the plan. In re
Hunter's Estate, 9'7 Colo. 2'79, 49 P. (2d) 1009; Police Protective Ass'n v. fVarren, 101 Colo. 586, '76 P. (2d) 94. In
Welch v. Henry, 59 Sup. Ct. 121, the Court, in sustaining
a State income tax imposed on a particular group because of the necessity for relief expenditures, said (p. 125):
"Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumed by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost o£
Government among those who in some measure
are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear
its burdens."
See also Clark v. Poor, 2'74 U. S. 554; Gillum v. johnson,
supra; Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Tfl allace, 288 U. S. 249,
268; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66; and Knights
v. !ackson, 260 U. S. 12, -15;-all sustaining a tax on a
group not necessarily related to the use to which the
proceeds were devoted. "Expense for relief of the unemployed is on no different footing than any other governmental expense." Scobbie v. Tax Commission, 225 Wis.
529, 538, 2'75 N. W. 531, 535.
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The fact that the group taxed may be more or less
related to the situation which necessitates an expenditure,
however, may justify classification. Head Money Cases,
112 U. S. 580 (tax on ship owners paid into fund for
relief of immigrants); State v. Cassidy, (18?5) 22 Minn.
312 (tax on saloon keepers to create a fund for relief of
inebriates); Cooley v. Board of fV ardens, 12 How. (U. S.)
299 (tax on pilotage to create a fund for relief of indigent
pilots and their dependents); Dayton Goose Creek Ry. Co.
v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (payment of a part of the
excess of railroad incomes to a fund to make loans to
other railroads); McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 2?4, 111
S. W. 688, (tax on dog owners for payments for sheep
killed by dogs): and Phoenix Assurance Co. of London v.
Fire Department of City of Montgomery, 117 Ala. 631, 23
So. 843 (tax on insurance companies for support of City
Fire Department). See also Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
219 U. S. 104.

The classifications resulting from Section 19(j) (5)
may therefore be justified either as a selection of a class
for a particular exaction, or a choice based on a more
or less intimate relationship between the class upon which
the exaction falls and the problem of unemployment.
Whichever basis is followed, the rule to be applied in
testing the validity of a classification is whether there
is any basis therefor, and this rule is equally applicable
to the classification under the unemployment compensation law. It is settled law that a legislative classification,
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when subject to judicial scrutiny will not be disturbed if
any conceivable state of facts would support the selections made. Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co.,
supra; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S.
219; Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., '72
Colo. 268, 211 P. 649, aff'd 262 U. S. 710; Consumer's
League of Colorado v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 53 Colo. 54,
125, P. 577; In re Hunter's Estate, supra. The United States
Supreme Court has often stated that, in the absence of
any facts tending to show that a classification under
a State act "in its purpose or: effect is a hostile or oppressive discrimination," the legislative classification would
not be disturbed. Welch v. Henry, supra. In Carmichael
v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra, the Supreme Court
said (p. 510):
"This restriction upon the judicial function, in
passing on the constitutionality of statutes, is not
artificial or irrational. A state legislature, in the
enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude
within the limits of the Constitution. In the nature
of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue
of the considerations which move its members to
enact laws. In the absence of such a record courts
cannot assume that its action is capricious, or
that, with its informed acquaintance with local
conditions to which the legislation is to be applied,
it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable
basis for its action. Only by faithful adherence
to this guiding principle of judicial review of
legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its
ability to function."
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The State legislature has the authority to extend the
protection of unemployment compensation to individuals
who are separated from the economic relationship which
has afforded them a livelihood whether it be that of
master and servant or a relationship that for purposes
of ex delicto liability may be designated as principal not
independent contractor. It may also protect those whose
economic relationships might be otherwise designated;
provided that the classification is reasonable and related
to the evil sought to be eliminated. In other words, where
for some purposes a landlord and tenant relationship is
believed to exist if it appears that the personal services
were performed under such circumstances as to fall
within the definition of "employment" there certainly
exists no legal basis for arguing that the Law is inapplicable or unconstitutional.
Fundamentally the "lessees" and their employees
bear the same economic relationship to the Company as
any other employees whose coverage is unquestioned by
the Company, and when separated from their "employment'' the loss to society, the evils, and social problems
that arise are no different than those arising from the
unemployment of the others.
The test of coverage is not whether, for purposes irrelevant to an unemployment compensation law, the
label "factor," "consignor," "independent contractor,"
"lessor," "landlord and tenant," etc., may be applicable
to the situation, but rather whether the circumstances
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under which the personal services were performed come
within the statutory definition of "employment."
We submit that the "lessees" and their employees
are, in fact, in no different position economically than
the other employees who are admittedly "in employment'' for the Company and that, therefore, this Court
should find that the plaintiff "lessees" are "in employment" within the meaning of the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Law.
Respectfully submitted,

GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General
S. D. HUFFAKER,
Deputy Attorney General
A.M. FERRO,
Special Assistant
Attorney General
F. F. DREMANN,
Special Counsel
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